I. INTRODUCTION
You must be the change you wish to see in the world. 1 HE business community is becoming increasingly globalized as boundaries for doing business among countries and their people and organizations disappear. This in turn is making international business easier and more mainstream. 2 In The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman argues that global connectivity of the markets, businesses, and consumers forces organizations to accept a diversity of people, culture, and ideas. 3 He emphasizes the changing nature of globalization:
[A]round the year 2000 we entered a whole new era: Globalization 3.0. Globalization 3.0 is shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny and flattening the playing field at the same time. And while the dynamic force in Globalization 1.0 was countries globalizing and the dynamic force in Globalization 2.0 was companies globalizing, the dynamic force in Globalization 3.0 -the force that gives [globalization] its unique character -is the newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally. 4 The United States and its businesses must understand the progress being made by other advanced countries and adopt progressive ideals in order to stay ahead. Additionally, the United States and its businesses should continue to be in the forefront of business practices, setting the standard for inclusiveness. Nowhere is this more important than on public company boards of directors.
Over the last decade, social activists, academics, government agencies, shareholder groups, and other investors have argued for greater diversity at 1 Often attributed to Mahatma Gandhi (Oct. 2, 1869 -Jan. 30, 1948 Defining diversity is often difficult, and the meaning of group diversity may be based on an array of attributes including education, experience, background, class, gender, race, or ethnicity. 5 Thus, in addressing diversity issues, it is critical to begin by defining what is meant by diversity. In its final rule on Regulation S-K-which requires new disclosures in the area of board leadership and structure and which addresses the board's role in risk oversight-the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made the definition of diversity flexible, recognizing that definitions of diversity will inevitably vary from one company to another. 6 For purposes of this Article, heterogeneous attributes that contribute to diversity are categorized as either "Modifiable Attributes" or "Non-Modifiable Attributes." "Modifiable Attributes" include education, experience, background, class, international exposure, and similarly distinguishing features into which a person is not born. "Non-Modifiable Attributes," on the other hand, consist of gender, race, ethnicity, and other distinguishing birth characteristics that cannot be easily altered.
Although board inclusiveness is relevant to for-profit companies, nonprofit organizations, governmental entities, and academic institutions, this Article focuses on board diversity as it relates to U.S. public companies. This Article addresses research on board heterogeneity; more specifically, it examines the emerging research on gender, race, and ethnicity as it pertains to public companies. The discussion of gender, race, and ethnic diversity is intended to illustrate current trends in board diversity and to highlight business and social arguments for and against board diversity. Of course, all In full, the SEC made the following statement in its final rule: "We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences in viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and national origin. We believe that for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined diversity in the amendments. " Id. board members should possess sufficient competency requirements and add value to the board. Following this introductory section, Section II provides cursory background information about the current state of boards of directors of U.S. public corporations, with particular focus on each of the following: the current lack of diversity on corporate boards; the obligations of boards; current guidance for selecting board members; and existing U.S. regulations regarding board diversity. Section III discusses: justifications and benefits for board diversity. Section IV details practical solutions for constructing better boards of directors. Finally, Section V concludes with a call for action among the boards of U.S. public companies. directors. 11 This lack of board diversity is especially notable when, for example, one considers that "women represent 53% of new hires." 12 "[A]t the very first step in career advancement-when individual contributors are promoted to managers -th[at] number drops to 37%." 13 " [O] nly 26% of vice presidents and senior executives are female and only 14% of the executive committee, on average, are women." 14 Joanna Barsh and Lareina Yee's research suggests that male and female managers ignore female candidates for more senior positions based on assumptions that the women cannot handle the positions' demands because of personal responsibilities or gender qualities. 15 Furthermore, Barsh and Yee note that "[s]everal diversity officers and experts told [them] that despite their best efforts, women are often evaluated for promotions primarily on performance, while men are often promoted on potential." 16 SEC leadership also expresses concern about the lack of diversity in U.S. public companies. As recently as May 2011, Commissioner Aguilar voiced his disdain for the lack of diversity in the corporations that he regulates. Commissioner Aguilar issued a statement commenting that "[e]ven though our nation has grown more diverse, the corporate boardroom is proving resistant to change," and "I find this status quo unacceptable and question why at a time when there are more qualified diverse board candidates, we have less diverse board members." 17 Just a few days before issuing these remarks, Aguilar gave a speech in which he stated, "It is past time to see the diversity of our nation reflected in corporate boardrooms, in the financial industry, and in the government." 18
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

A. The Current Lack of Diversity on Corporate Boards
B. The Obligations of the Board of Directors
In general, the purpose of the board of directors is to monitor and evaluate senior management of the company. State law, which typically regulates the day-to-day management of a corporation, establishes that the obligations of the board of directors to its shareholders are the duties of care and loyalty; additionally, the duty of loyalty includes the obligation of good faith. 19 A diverse group of directors may be a way to assist directors in fulfilling their duties of care and loyalty.
In the Delaware case Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court held that directors have an "unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders" because the board of directors manages the business and affairs of the corporation. 20 It is important to note that Delaware law typically has a high standard for establishing director and officer liability for corporate operations. Under the business judgment rule, courts do not delve into the content of evaluations the board makes in coming to business decisions. Rather, the courts defer to directors, expecting them to make business decisions after informed consideration. 21 "The determination of whether a business judgment is 'informed' turns on whether the directors have informed themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.'" 22 A party alleging that the board breached its duty of care must overcome the presumption that the board made an informed business decision. 23 Even in the post-Enron era of higher standards for fiduciary obligations, courts (including those in Delaware) still focus on whether managers and directors met minimum procedural requirements. 24 To constitute a breach of the business judgment rule, directors' actions must constitute gross negligence. 25 Thus, a shareholder claim that a board of directors failed to meet its duty of care will rarely be successful. 26 However, Van Gorkom functions as a reminder that directors must exercise "due care and prudence" before taking action on a board matter and must disclose all material facts relevant to a transaction subject to a shareholder vote. 27 But, as evidenced in In re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the business judgment rule will protect managers and directors, even when risky board decisions result in large losses, as long as the decisions in question were informed. 28 Some scholars have argued that a board's failure to address diversity issues constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 29 Professor Joo argues that the odds of winning a claim on these grounds are slim.
[I]t might be argued that directors were presented with a specific opportunity to address diversity to the material benefit of the corporation and its shareholders, yet dismissed it without information or consideration. These cases have the potential for success. And certainly directors violate their duties in those rare instances where they can be shown to have ignored corporate interests and acted out of personal racial animus. But if directors rejected diversity-based policies in a formally proper way, or if the issue is never squarely presented to the board, a court will not entertain a shareholder's retrospective complaint that the result was a costly one, much less that it failed to maximize returns. 30 Thus, the current threshold showing that existing board members "ignored corporate interests and acted out of personal racial animus" is high enough to practically foreclose the possibility of a shareholder challenge regarding board diversity. 31 The second prong of the board of directors' fiduciary obligation is the duty of loyalty, which requires directors to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation. Acting in good faith includes: (1) not engaging in self-dealing and unlawful activity; (2) avoiding passiveness that enables the diversion of corporate assets and profits or causes other frauds upon the corporation; and (3) affirmatively acting with good intentions to monitor the corporation's affairs and the corporation's compliance with law. 32 Without substantiating empirical evidence, given the benefits and justifications for management diversity, including greater questioning and discussion with diverse boards, it appears that a diverse board can assist (2010) (analyzing an important component of a director's duty of loyalty by examining the role of good faith in corporate law and its use as the standard by which a director must act for compliance with his or her duty of loyalty obligation and concludes that the good faith obligation in meeting a director's duty of loyalty obligation (i) is broad as it prohibits self-dealing (for financial gain and otherwise) and acting for unlawful purposes and (ii) requires affirmative action by the director to make a good faith effort to monitor the corporation's affairs and compliance with law).
directors in meeting their fiduciary obligations.
C. Current Guidance for Selecting Board Members
A key challenge for board composition is building a group that can work cohesively, offer constructive dissent, leverage each member's experience to better understand tough issues, ask thought-provoking questions, demand pertinent information, and make the best informed decisions, while consistently adding value. 33 Although there appear to be no specific U.S. laws requiring board diversity, several sources provide legal guidance for director qualifications, such as the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual, and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) Equity Rules.
Under the DGCL, a corporation's board of directors and shareholders have authority to adopt bylaw provisions that specify the requisite qualifications for becoming a director. 34 he number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner provided in, the bylaws, unless the certificate of incorporation fixes the number of directors, in which case a change in the number of directors shall be made only by amendment of the certificate. Directors need not be stockholders unless so required by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. The certificate of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe other qualifications for directors." Pursuant to the DGCL, amendments to the certificate of incorporation require recommendation of such amendment by the board to the shareholders and approval by the shareholders, if the corporation is a stock corporation. Additionally, modifications of the bylaws of Delaware stock corporations require board of director recommendation and shareholder approval, as bylaw modifications are major corporate actions. Section 242(b)(1) of the DGCL, regarding approval for certificate of incorporation modifications, provides in part the next provision. "If the corporation has capital stock, its board of directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either calling a special meeting of the stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof for the consideration of such amendment or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next annual meeting of the stockholders. . . . At the meeting a vote of the stockholders entitled to vote thereon shall be taken for and against the proposed amendment. If a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote thereon, and a majority of the outstanding stock of each class entitled to vote thereon as a class has been voted in favor of the amendment, a certificate setting forth the amendment and certifying that such amendment has been duly adopted in accordance with this section shall be executed . . . ." Section 109(a) of the DGCL provides in part the following provision with respect to amendments to the bylaws of stock corporations:. "After a corporation . . . has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws
Company Manual 35 provides that a listed company's corporate governance guidelines should address the corporation's director qualification standards. 36 The NASDAQ Equity Rules require that each listed company have a board of directors that consists of a majority of Independent Directors (as defined in Rule 5605(a)(2) of the NASDAQ Equity Rules). 37 A large number of corporations have non-binding frameworks for director qualifications in their corporate governance policies, guidelines, or similar governance mechanisms. Many such policies are responses to the SEC's rule regarding disclosure of directors' or boards of directors' information. 38 Beverly Behan 39 has developed a three-prong model for evaluating the best directors in the boardroom: (1) skills and experience; (2) individual attributes; and (3) representative factors. 40 To flesh out this model, Behan posits that first, companies should develop a list of the skills and experiences that are useful for understanding directors' individual circumstances, such as industry specific knowledge, finance and economics background, executive level experience, international exposure, and marketing and consumer behavior experience. 41 Second, companies should list the individual attributes shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote. . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . . The fact that such power has been so conferred upon the directors . . . shall not divest the stockholders . . . of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws. that each board member should ideally possess, such as independence, financial acumen, management background, confidence, and teamwork. 42 Third, the company should attempt to benefit from a comprehensive approach to diversity. 43 Some companies are expanding their candidate searches to rising talent that is not recognized by name in the board network. Such companies have begun tapping into the ranks below the C-suite for qualified talent. By recruiting corporate board candidates outside the C-suite, such as leaders of corporate divisions and middle management leaders, boards increase their diversity options. Furthermore, recruiting such talent outside the C-suite can improve the board's understanding of the company's internal operations, since such employees are closer to the organization's day-to-day operations and, thus, are likely to bring a different perspective to the boardroom.
D. Existing U.S. Regulations Regarding Boardroom Diversity
Transparency is essential to enabling consumers 44 to decide the manner in which to use their monies. The SEC has recently increased the visibility of diversity initiatives relating to U.S. public company boards of directors. In response to capital market requests for diversity disclosure, 45 the SEC adopted a regulation, effective February 28, 2010, requiring public companies to disclose the following information: "[(1)] whether diversity is a factor in considering candidates for nomination to the board of directors, [(2)] how diversity is considered in that process, and [(3)] how the company assesses the effectiveness of its policy for considering diversity." 46 Former Chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, has even spoken on the need for user-friendly and value-adding disclosures, which take into account the needs of investors, directors, and others who rely on such disclosures. 47 This Article, however, argues that additional regulation requiring more specific disclosure information on the corporation's board nominees is necessary. The existing regulation does not require actual facts about directors 42 or director nominees; thus, there is a reliance on the company to disclose more than the required amount of information to meet the subjective spirit of the rule. Opponents of the requested regulation may argue that the SEC's existing director disclosure rule is sufficient to capture information about board diversity and that companies should have discretion on the specifics of disclosed information. However, the current lack of more detailed guidance requires the SEC to make case-by-case requests for more specific diversity information. Additionally, the current limited disclosure requirements may not be truly useful to consumers in making informed market decisions.
III. BOARD DIVERSITY: JUSTIFICATIONS AND BENEFITS
A. Rationales for Board Diversity
Business Rationale
In the early to mid-2000s, many legal and business scholars used a business rationale, concentrating on market-based and economic-based justifications, to support arguments for and against increased corporate board diversity. 48 Many advocated for increased corporate board diversity, focusing on Non-Modifiable Attributes, particularly gender, race, and ethnicity. 49 They argued that increased board diversity (based on gender, race, and ethnicity, depending on the particular scholar's approach to defining or segmenting diversity) "increases the overall effectiveness of the board and hence the corporation, [and] also enhances the corporation's profitability." 50 Adams and Ferreira, in discussing the strong-arm tactics that some international legislators have taken to implement gender-diverse boards, conclude that "gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors" of corporate governance, as illustrated by the finding that the proportion of women on the board is an important factor affecting the prevalence of CEO turnover following poor stock performance. 51 The strong monitoring argument often results from the notion and findings that diversity increases board independence, reduces board member collusion, and fosters tough questioning, thus imposing a check on management. 52 Additionally, Adams and Ferreira "conclude that strong evidence exists that the proportion of female directors is associated with more equity-based pay for directors, which is suggestive of a board that is more aligned with the interests of shareholders." 53 Adams and Ferreira found, however, that gender diversity quotas may harm corporations that are already well governed. 54 They reason that the additional governance attributed to more gender diverse boards is counterproductive and that heterogeneity of directors can cause conflict on the board. 55 They thus conclude that corporations should not institute a female-diverse board under a blanket expectation that doing so will improve performance. 56 However, Catalyst's recent research results indicate that increased female board membership can improve return on invested capital. In its 2011 report, Catalyst reported a twenty-six percent positive difference in return on invested capital between companies with women comprising nineteen to forty-four percent on the board of directors versus companies with no female directors. 57 Directors, executives, regulators, and consultants cite six main reasons to implement broader diversity programs: (1) access to and utilization of untapped talent in order to include the best available human resources; (2) women and minorities have greater independence from management and therefore reduce the risk of management being self-serving; (3) diverse boards generate more information; (4) heterogeneous boards operate differently than homogenous boards; (5) diverse boards signal credibility of positive corporate behavior; and (6) board diversity is a public relations tactic to quiet diversity advocates. 58 For the purposes of this Article, these justifications will be 
Argument Title Counterarguments 59
Efficient Talent Utilization:
The number of qualified minority and female candidates for corporate board positions is limited with very few having prior board service.
Management Self-Serving Risk Reduction; Greater Due Diligence:
As advocated in Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance, women arguably monitor more aggressively than men; however, excess monitoring in well-governed corporations leads to inefficiency and shareholder costs.
Different People Different Activity:
Although there are arguments that board diversity brings constructive questioning and disagreements to the boardroom, an alternative argument is that such dissent may result in hostility, unproductive behavior, and group dissatisfaction and turnover.
Credibility Sign:
It is difficult to estimate the costs and benefits and determine the reliability of the signaling rationale for board diversity.
Pacification Maneuver:
Board diversity only pacifies proponents of board diversity, but appeasing others creates no shareholder benefits.
Social Rationale
There are three main social rationales for board diversity. First is the "simple fairness" argument: "corporate boards should be more diverse because it is the morally correct outcome." 60 The reasons this argument is appealing is twofold. First, upper organizational echelons in corporate discusses, and discussing the dangers of advocating for diversity by categorizing women and minorities, as such causes a slippery slope by stereotyping and placing them as the voice for their gender and race). America-including corporate boards of directors-should reflect the base. Second, women and minorities in such positions have the power to influence the youth of underrepresented groups in such top organizations and positively to influence employee and customer relations because such diverse persons (a) represent a signal of the company's diversity focus and progress and (b) demonstrate empathy with employees and customers. 61 "Group think" dilution is the second prominent social rationale for board diversity. It refers to "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of action." 62 A diverse board may reduce the risk of groupthink by creating a more tolerant environment. 63 The third social justification for board diversity is to eradicate CEOs' "stacking the board." A diverse board arguably can influence the board nomination process and curtail the CEO clone syndrome, or CEO parity concept-that is, lining the board with the CEOs of other companies who are happy to aid the CEO in his agendas through their voting preferences. The CEO "stacking the board" in his or her favor, has been the subject of complex debate in U.S. corporate law and in related reform.
Progressive Theory
The Progressive Theory is a combination of the business and social rationales along with other rationales-namely, the governance perspective, a global rationale, and the human factor rationale. The governance perspective consists of three principles: (1) a pipeline of qualified diverse board candidates, (2) comprehensive due diligence for business judgment protection; and (3) respect for the requests of institutional investors. The global rationale focuses on the U.S. population and its diminishing workforce, and the human factor rationale emphasizes human traits that may enhance the board's workings. The push for a Progressive Theory justification for board diversity starts with a simple qualitative argument for inclusiveness. Corporate boards should consist of an environment that enables and supports a collective group of qualified people with varied differences to engage in a positive and challenging discussion. The discussion's goal is to add value to the corporation and its stakeholders by building a more complete consensus 61 among a diversity of viewpoints.
a. The Governance Perspective i. A Pipeline of Qualified Diverse Board Candidates
The traditional pool of potential board candidates is shrinking for a number of reasons, including: (1) increased liability (whether actual or perceived by the director or potential candidate) and increased commitment involved with being a public company director; (2) many existing directors are resigning or seeking no reelection; and (3) potential candidates are shying away from board service. 64 Board effectiveness demands change consistent with the needs of the corporation. The shrinking pool of candidates makes succession planning critical for ensuring that the optimal mix of director talent is available when needed. Therefore, a company's board and senior management must understand and take into account the company's shortterm and long-term strategic plan. They must evaluate the current composition of the board of directors, including the strengths and weaknesses. A board must also plan for its future human capital needs by filling gaps for missing skill sets that are necessary in the global marketplace. Finally, as companies look toward filling future boardrooms, a special focus should be placed on diversity-gender, race, ethnicity, class, background, international experience, education, and industry and functional skills.
ii. Comprehensive Due Diligence for Business Judgment Protection
Empirical research indicates that gender diverse boards improve board attendance, which in turn results in greater due diligence. 65 Additionally, social and psychological research indicates that individuals make decisions based on their backgrounds and experiences. 66 Thus, when groups are homogeneous, there is little opportunity to flesh out varied viewpoints and to utilize different analytical techniques, which otherwise would result in greater board due diligence. 67 
iii. Respect the Requests of Institutional Investors
Some of the largest institutional investors support and even take active steps to encourage more diverse boards. 69 For example, one of TIAA-CREF's positions on board diversity is that board nominating committees should utilize fitting diversity criteria for a director search to ensure that the search considers the largest applicable talent base. 70 See Appendix B for more excerpts of the policy positions of large institutional investors on their expectations regarding diversity of portfolio companies.
b. The Global Rationale
The boardrooms of U.S. companies should reflect the changing racial and ethnic population of the U.S. and world marketplace. Although the nonHispanic white population currently remains the majority race and ethnic class in the United States, it is growing more slowly than other racial and ethnic groups and actually has decreased from 69% to 64% of the total population over the last decade. 71 The Hispanic and Asian populations in the United States have experienced the most rapid growth over that time period. 72 The Hispanic or Latino origin population in the U.S. is projected to increase 74 Because this data demonstrates the racial, ethnic, and international composition of the future U.S. and world workforce and consumer base, immediate steps by U.S. companies to diversity its boardroom to reflect the world's changing population will make the U.S. companies top management a reflection of the U.S. and world marketplace.
c. The Human Factor Rationale
People with diverse backgrounds and experiences often develop different methodologies towards approaching corporate decision making. This leads to varied comments and discussions on topics before the board of directors, which is essential to a meaningful understanding of corporate issues. This balance of thoughts and ideas engenders tolerance and empathy for corporate stakeholders, who are also from a diversity of backgrounds, because the diverse board likely consists of a party with direct or indirect experience similar to the corporate stakeholders being impacted by the strategic issues before the board.
B. Benefits of Board Diversity: Optimizing Director Behavior under Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is often viewed from two different perspectivesshareholder theory and stakeholder theory-however, boards of directors that approach decision making from a middle ground can arguably obtain socially and economically maximizing outcomes more often. And, importantly, a diverse board of directors is more likely than a nondiverse board to have the incentives to operate from that middle ground.
Under the limited shareholder theory, corporate governance is dominated by owners and managers, who guide the organization to further the owners' best interests. 75 The underlying rationale is as follows: shareholders "risk their investment capital and are the sole residual claimants, while other parties (e.g., employees) are compensated on the basis of their marginal products . . . [with] 76 Under stakeholder theory, in developing its corporate strategies, an organization should consider the best interests of the groups and individuals who are affected by or who can influence the organization and its mission. Typically, the stakeholder theory is justified by corporate social responsibility. Moreover, although shareholders risk monetary or human capital, so do some non-shareholders. 77 Some scholars expand stakeholder theory further to require stakeholder representation on the board of directors in order to legitimatize and protect stakeholder interests and to ensure that management will consider stakeholder concerns in designing corporate strategy and in making decisions. 78 There should be representation specifically for those stakeholders that "add value, assume unique risks and possess strategic information for the corporation." 79 In sum, "the board must have directors who can knowledgeably express the multiple constituents' interests both from ethical and economic reasons." 80 There is a third position -one that seeks middle ground between the two theories. Such position can be summed up by the words of the quintessential capitalist Milton Friedman: "[M]ake as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom." 81
IV. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING BETTER BOARDS
The entrenched beliefs of individuals often function to prohibit or slow diversity advancements. 82 Although the legislative and judicial bodies strove to eradicate overt discrimination with laws such as Title VII of the Civil 76 Id. at 3. Note, however, that "no courts actually require management to maximize shareholder wealth -that is, to show that they have chosen to use one of the corporate resources that will generate more net wealth than the other." Joo, supra note 21, at 16-17. To do so would utterly undermine the business judgment rule. Rights Act of 1964, many forms of bias with respect to race, gender, ethnicity, and class continue to exist in business, whether intentional or not. Professor Steven Ramirez points out that "the bastions of corporate governance remain the nearly exclusive province of white males, with no realistic end in sight. This racial homogeneity exists with little overt racial discrimination and few violations of antidiscrimination law." 83 Ramirez calls for legal reform to improve board diversity indicating that "real corporate governance reform should focus on neutralizing CEO influence over the board selection process and in the boardroom generally." 84 This section proposes some legislative reform and provides a strategy for improving board diversity.
A. Proposed Transparency Regulation
Despite existing regulations, determining the gender and race of board members remains difficult. The consumer's ability to do so has improved over time because some organizations now include photographs of board members in their annual proxy statements; however, the difficulties inherent in accurately determining the gender and race of a board member remain. 85 Furthermore, without a requirement that director biographies contain specific information on how a board member adds diversity to the board, consumers cannot easily evaluate the Non-Modifiable and Modifiable Attributes that underpin a comprehensive definition of diversity.
To provide the consumer with more useful disclosure, the public filing disclosure rules should require that Modifiable Attributes-specifically postsecondary degrees, international background or exposure, key highlights of the last twenty years of employment history, and key current and past forprofit and not-for-profit board service-and Non-Modifiable Attributesspecifically race, gender, and ethnicity-must be disclosed in annual proxies. Such regulation would enable consumers to assess the level of diversity of 83 Ramirez, supra note 63, at 1584-87 (arguing that board homogeneity in favor of white males of upper class distinction exists on corporate boards of directors because of their cultural proximity to corporate CEOs and calling for political and economic pressure on the applicable human power sources to institute legal reform to enhance board diversity). 84 Id. 85 See e.g., Fairfax, supra note 48, at 799 n.16 (discussing the difficulty of determining the number of directors of color on corporate boards of directors with reasonable accuracy and focuses on and critically examines the business rationales for increasing racial and ethnic diversity on corporate boards of directors with a discussion on the cost-benefit analysis of such board diversity, pointing out some individual and societal costs and concluding that such examined business rationales establish an environment subjecting directors of color to unrealistic expectations of solving corporate issues that are not simplistic and possibly not of their particular interest).
specific companies and to base their investment and purchase decisions on more complete information. There are two main arguments against enhancing board disclosure rules for transparency purposes. The first stems from the general debate about the effectiveness of legislative and regulatory actions and their impact on corporate governance in practice. This Article, however, does not assume that legislative or regulatory action or market rules totally control board member behavior or singly determine overall board effectiveness. The second argument contends that it is wasteful to enhance board disclosure rules for transparency purposes because few consumers will look at the disclosures in making market decisions. However, that argument fails to take into account the importance of providing consumers with the means to make wellinformed decisions.
In the Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-9052, the SEC sought input from investors and other market participants on their desire for greater disclosure regarding diversity in the boardroom. 86 Ninety percent of respondents expressed support for race and gender board disclosure. 87 In so doing, those respondents-controlling over three trillion dollars in assets-indicated their desire to have information about board diversity to assist them in evaluating current and potential investments. 88
B. Tier-7 Diversity Strategy
The Tier-7 Diversity Strategy is an approach for moving toward inclusiveness and continuous evolution of diversity-(1) Preparing Early; (2) Post-Secondary Governance Study and Training; (3) Promoting from Middle Management; (4) Establishing an Inclusive Nominating Committee; (5) Utilizing Available Diversity Information; (6) Being Intentional; and (7) Understanding International Actions on Board Diversity. 
Preparing Early
A lack of qualified diverse director options is often cited as an explanation for the lack of board diversity. For the purposes of this Article, this explanation will be called the Diverse Director Limitation Argument. The lack of qualified diverse director options could be addressed by focusing on training underrepresented groups in finance, economics, and law-the fields most prevalent in the backgrounds of existing directors. Over the years, the Diverse Director Limitation Argument has centered on women and persons of color, so the training should focus on this talent pool.
Concern exists about equal educational opportunities for all students living in the United States. There is "classism" in the U.S. society, which is often masked as being racial:
[E]ducational outcomes for minority children are much more a function of their unequal access to key educational resources, including skilled teachers and quality curriculum, than they are a function of race. In fact, the U.S. educational system is one of the most unequal in the industrialized world, and students routinely receive dramatically different learning opportunities based on their social status. In contrast to European and Asian nations that fund schools centrally and equally, the wealthiest 10 percent of U.S. school districts spend nearly 10 times more than the poorest 10 percent, and spending ratios of 3 to 1 are common within states. Despite stark differences in funding, teacher quality, curriculum, and class sizes, the prevailing view is that if students do not achieve, it is their own fault. If we are ever to get beyond the problem of the color line, we must confront and address these inequalities. 89 Thus, early stage preparation requires the tough evaluation and implementation of equal educational opportunities across all educational systems.
Additionally, the NASDAQ and NYSE audit committees' financial literacy requirements, along with SOX disclosure requirements regarding financial literacy of audit committee members, exemplify the need for taking immediate, active steps to build the diversity pipeline of board candidates. 90 For example, SOX provides that:
For purposes of this Item, an audit committee financial expert means a person who has the following attributes: (A) [a]n understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements; (B) [t]he ability to assess the general application of such principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves; (C) [e]xperience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the registrant's financial statements, or experience actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities; (D) [a]n understanding of internal control over financial reporting; and (E) [a]n understanding of audit committee functions. 91 The argument to prepare historically underrepresented diverse students with potential interests or acumen for public company board service does not hold that such parties must be financially astute. However, to increase the talent pool of diverse board candidates and to address the Diverse Director Limitation Argument, there should be a greater focus on preparing such underrepresented groups' youth in these subject matter areas.
Post-Secondary Governance Study and Training
Providing underrepresented group director trainees with adequate corporate governance training on the roles and obligations of board members is another method for addressing the Diverse Director Limitation Argument. Additionally, such study and training can assist in combating the perception that diverse board members may have individual values that do not align with 90 shareholder values. Training programs should include guidance on selecting career paths within a designated industry, specifically in industries that lack diversity. This industry specialization approach would provide diverse director protégées with opportunities early in the director training process to gain insight and experience in a specific industry.
Because female directors are notably less prevalent in industries such as energy, infrastructure, electronics, and technology than in other industries, 92 a greater focus should be placed on exposing females to these underrepresented industries and on providing them with training and advancement opportunities within these industries. 93 Finally, after SOX, it appears that public company experience is important in having public company directorship opportunities. 94 Thus, corporate senior management can help identify internal talent for board service and utilize platforms to prepare, mentor, and support diverse candidates in preparation for service on other corporate boards.
Promoting from Middle Management
In for-profit, not-for-profit, government, and academic environments, dedication to promoting diverse talent beyond middle management is essential to building the diverse director pipeline. The goals of talent development and enhancement are (1) to identify the top talent; (2) to develop and to implement a tailored training program focusing on the person's skills and interests and then-current industry needs; and (3) to push the individual out of his or her comfort zone to encourage growth.
Establishing an Inclusive Nominating Committee
The nominating committee is extremely influential in shaping board diversity. It establishes a slate of director candidates, recommends such candidates to the full board of directors for approval, and sets director pay. 95 The full board then provides its recommendation to shareholders for a vote. Because the nominating committee seeks out and provides initial nominees to the full board of directors, it is a powerful medium for achieving diversity. It is therefore important to have diverse nominating committee members, as well as members with an appreciation for the benefits of diversity.
Utilizing Available Diversity Information
Sources exist that allow organizations to obtain a list of potential director candidates that meet specified diversity criteria. For example, CalPERS and California State Teachers' Retirement System developed the concept for the Diverse Director DataSource, a diverse director database that may be useful for organizations seeking diverse talent for board service. 96 Similarly, the Center for Civil Rights at the University of North Carolina School of Law, in conjunction with the Center for Banking and Finance, maintains the Director Diversity Initiative, a digital database of diverse director candidate options. 97 The Director Diversity Initiative aims to increase gender, racial, and ethnic diversity on the boards of public companies and to develop and sponsor programs focused on director training. 98 Sources such as the Diverse Director DataSource and the Director Diversity Initiative can be used to build comprehensively diverse boards of directors as well as to improve the pipeline for meeting existing and future diverse director needs.
Being Intentional: Exercising Self-Action, Being Proactive in Alignment, and Voicing Board Service Interest
To effectively build a pipeline of diverse board talent and to combat the Diverse Board Limitation Argument, diverse board talent must affirmatively participate in solutions for improvement. Historically, board candidate names are drawn from "elite" social networks. The lack of access that minority groups typically have to such networks may be one contributing factor to the perceived shortage of qualified minority candidates for corporate board service. 99 Hence, members of diverse groups with board aspirations need to build their social networks to include members of "elite" social networks and to communicate board service desires. In short, aspiring minority candidates should act with the intention of building careers and networks that will help propel them to board service.
Understanding International Actions on Board Diversity
Many Western countries have been more progressive than the United States in taking action to increase heterogeneity on boards of directors. For example, after conducting studies on ways to achieve greater board diversity, 100 the United Kingdom now requires companies "to 'pay due regard to benefits of diversity on the board, including gender' when searching for and appointing directors." 101 In Australia, corporations are required to disclose the company's progress toward board-established gender objectives, including disclosure of the number of females on the board of directors. 102 The Swedish government has threatened to institute gender diversity requirements on companies if companies fail to voluntarily allocate 25% of the board seats to female directors. 103 The Norwegian government requires all listed companies to abide by a 40% female director quota, with noncompliance resulting in automatic corporate dissolution. 104 Notably, as of April 2008, all Norwegian listed companies were in full compliance. 105 Spain has also enacted statutes requiring listed companies to comply with a 40% female director quota by 2015. 106 Moreover, the rapid growth of emerging international markets suggests that the above-mentioned foreign economies will start contributing to global governance policies and direction. Although the U.S. has made some headway in the area of board diversity through the actions of the SEC, 107 U.S. corporations will need to emulate the progress made in certain foreign countries in order to remain competitive. It is important to note that, although the United States needs to emulate the progress of certain foreign nations, the means by which this is accomplished must be tailored for U.S. companies. Accordingly, this Article does not advocate for and is not an endorsement of using quotas to achieve diversity on boards of directors and instead argues for the implementation of the mechanisms discussed in this Article. 
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, this Article addresses the need and importance of constructing boards of directors that reflect the demographics and composition of the global marketplace that the companies serve. Additionally, this Article focuses on a middle ground of the corporate governance theories, while simultaneously providing practical solutions for curtailing obstacles to board diversity. The goal of this Article is to help parties to understand the need for board diversity and to persuade parties to work collectively in seeking better processes and solutions for diversity. Ultimately, this will enable the U.S. corporate structure to become a model of inclusiveness for the global business environment.
Immediate action is necessary as the global marketplace continues to grow and becomes more complicated. Countries that have been historically considered secondary to the United States in terms of setting standards on corporate activity and legislative initiative are taking bold actions to rectify and enhance particular platforms of corporate diversity. 108 These countries are taking the lead on many corporate diversity initiatives. 109 A push for regulatory action requiring additional corporate disclosure is envisioned. Such disclosure would create a more transparent environment in which consumers could make informed decisions regarding their market behavior. With more meaningful disclosures informing consumers of director identities, consumers will have the ability to make more informed market choices. Specifically, investors and consumers will be able to patronize companies that promote inclusiveness and diversity in their boardrooms. Additionally, the Tier-7 Diversity Strategy is the other practical solution for constructing better boards. The Tier-7 Diversity Strategy can assist in moving toward inclusiveness and a continuous evolution of diversity. The Tier-7 Diversity Strategy is: (1) Preparing Early; (2) Post-Secondary Governance Study and Training; (3) Promoting from Middle Management; (4) Establishing an Inclusive Nominating Committee; (5) Utilizing Available Diversity Information; (6) Being Intentional; and (7) Understanding International Actions on Board Diversity.
The calls for action in this Article represent a two-way request for shared responsibility. The responsibility for action falls among consumers, corporations, and the government. Consumers have to invest time in 108 Id. at 1. 109 Id. investigating corporations and in deciding the best ways to utilize their scarce resources. Corporations must make meaningful diversity disclosures, and the government needs to enforce a mandatory disclosure regime. U.S. corporations should serve as innovators by building a qualified, diverse pipeline for boards of directors and by providing greater beneficial consumer disclosure regarding board membership. By so doing, U.S. corporations could demonstrate a highly progressive governance strategy-one that begins by addressing diversity at the highest level.
APPENDIX A
In providing a small sample of representative director qualification provisions from for-profit publicly traded corporations, this Article includes provisions from the corporate governance policies of Apple Inc. ("Apple"), representing a convergence company, Bank of America Corporation ("BofA"), representing a large financial institution, and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Walmart"), representing a multinational consumer corporation.
Apple's Director Qualifications: 110
Director Qualifications. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee is responsible for reviewing the qualifications of potential director candidates and recommending to the Board those candidates to be nominated for election to the Board. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee will consider the individual's background, skills and abilities, and determine whether such characteristics qualify the individual to fulfill the needs of the Board at that time. The Board should monitor the mix of skills and experience of its directors in order to assure that the Board has the necessary tools to perform its oversight function effectively. Shareholders also may nominate directors for election at the Corporation's annual meeting of shareholders by following the provisions set forth in the Corporation's bylaws. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee will consider their qualifications. Candidates should be selected for, among other things, their independence, character, ability to exercise sound judgment, diversity, age, demonstrated leadership, skills, including financial literacy, and experience in the context of the needs of the Board.
BofA's Director Qualifications: 111
Director Assessment and Nomination.
The Corporate Governance Committee, in consultation with the Chairman, will identify and evaluate individual candidates for their qualifications to become directors. The Committee will recommend qualified candidates to the Board as the need arises to fill vacancies or to stand for election at the annual meeting of stockholders, unless the Company has contractually granted the right to nominate directors to third parties.
Standards for Evaluating
Candidates as Director-Nominees. To discharge their duties in identifying and evaluating individual nominees for directors, the Corporate Governance Committee and the Board shall consider the overall experience and expertise represented by the Board as well as the qualifications of each candidate. In the evaluation process, the Corporate Governance Committee and the Board shall take the following into account:
 At least a majority of the Board must be comprised of independent directors.  Candidates should be capable of working in a collegial manner with persons of different educational, business and cultural backgrounds and should possess skills and expertise that complement the attributes of the existing directors.  Candidates should represent a diversity of viewpoints, backgrounds, experiences and other demographics.  Candidates should demonstrate notable or significant achievement and possess senior-level business, management or regulatory experience that would benefit the Company.  Candidates shall be individuals of the highest character and integrity.  Candidates shall be free from any conflict of interest that would interfere with their ability to properly discharge their duties as a director or would violate any applicable law or regulation.  Candidates shall be capable of devoting the necessary time to discharge their duties, taking into account memberships on other Boards and other responsibilities.  Candidates shall have the desire to represent the interests of all stockholders.
Walmart's Director Qualifications: 112
Director Qualifications. The Board should have a majority of directors who meet the criteria for independence required by the NYSE. The Compensation, Nominating and Governance Committees are responsible for reviewing with the Board, on an annual basis, the requisite skills and characteristics that the Board seeks in Board members as well as the composition of the Board as a whole, including an annual evaluation of whether members qualify as independent under applicable standards. During the course of a year, directors are expected to inform the Board of any material changes in their circumstances or relationships that may impact their designation by the Board as independent. Nominees for director will be selected on the basis of outstanding achievement in their personal careers; broad experience; wisdom; integrity; ability to make independent, analytical inquiries; understanding of the business environment; and willingness to devote adequate time to Board duties. The Board believes that each director should have a basic understanding of: (i) the principal operational and financial objectives and plans and strategies of the Company; (ii) the results of operations and financial condition of the Company and of any significant subsidiaries or business segments; and (iii) the relative standing of the Company and its business segments in relation to its competitors. The Board is committed to diversified membership. The Board will not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or disability in selecting nominees. company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices." 118 California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS") Business Description:
CalPERS is a public pension fund, providing retirement benefits to California state, public school, and local public agency employees and their families with certain health benefits to some members.
Board Diversity Policy Position Excerpts:
"No board can truly perform its function of overseeing a company's strategic direction and monitoring management's success without a system of evaluating itself. In CalPERS' view, each director should fit within the skill sets identified by the board as necessary to focus board attention on optimizing company operating performance and returns to shareowners. . . . With this in mind, CalPERS recommends that: . . .
[1] The board establishes and discloses the mix of director attributes, experiences, diverse perspectives and skill sets that are most appropriate for the company. Core attributes of directors that make up a board should address accounting or finance, international markets, business or management experience, industry knowledge, customer-base experience or perspective, crisis response, leadership and strategic planning as well as address historically underrepresented groups on the board, including women and minorities.
[2] With each director nomination recommendation, the board should consider the issue of continuing director tenure, as well as board diversity, and take steps as necessary to ensure that the board maintains openness to new ideas and a willingness to critically reexamine the status quo." 119 
